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Improved Metric Distortion for Deterministic Social Choice
Rules
KAMESH MUNAGALA, Computer Science, Duke University
KANGNING WANG, Computer Science, Duke University
In this paper, we study the metric distortion of deterministic social choice rules that choose a winning candi-
date from a set of candidates based on voter preferences. Voters and candidates are located in an underlying
metric space. A voter has cost equal to her distance to the winning candidate. Ordinal social choice rules only
have access to the ordinal preferences of the voters that are assumed to be consistent with the metric dis-
tances. Our goal is to design an ordinal social choice rule with minimum distortion, which is the worst-case
ratio, over all consistent metrics, between the social cost of the rule and that of the optimal omniscient rule
with knowledge of the underlying metric space.
The distortion of the best deterministic social choice rule was known to be between 3 and 5. It had been
conjectured that any rule that only looks at the weighted tournament graph on the candidates cannot have
distortion better than 5. In our paper, we disprove it by presenting a weighted tournament rule with distortion
of 4.236. We design this rule by generalizing the classic notion of uncovered sets, and further show that this
class of rules cannot have distortion better than 4.236. We then propose a new voting rule, via an alternative
generalization of uncovered sets. We show that if a candidate satisfying the criterion of this voting rule
exists, then choosing such a candidate yields a distortion bound of 3, matching the lower bound. We present
a combinatorial conjecture that implies distortion of 3, and verify it for small numbers of candidates and
voters by computer experiments. Using our framework, we also show that selecting any candidate guarantees
distortion of at most 3 when the weighted tournament graph is cyclically symmetric.
1 INTRODUCTION
Collective decision making and social choice are the cornerstones of modern democracy. Mathe-
matically, a social choice rule is a function that maps ordinal preferences of voters for alternatives
(or candidates) to a single winning alternative. One way to characterize social choice rules is by
adopting the axiomatic approach. Exemplary works include [14] and [21], where several natural
desirable properties of social choice rules are proposed, and many of them are shown to be incom-
patible with each other.
An alternative approach is to adopt the utilitarian view, where agents have latent cardinal prefer-
ences underlying the ordinal preferences [5, 6, 20]. The goal is to optimize certain social objectives,
the most common being the sum of utilities of the voters. The term distortion of a social choice
rule refers to the worst-case ratio between the objective value that the rule achieves and the opti-
mal one, where the worst case is over all cardinal preferences that are consistent with the given
ordinal preferences. However, it has been established that many common rules have unbounded
distortion [20] and even randomized social choice rules have distortion of at least Ω
(√
n
)
, where
n is the number of candidates [5].
These impossibility results necessitate imposing additional structure on the underlying cardinal
preferences. One common approach is the spatial model, where voters and candidates are located
in a certain space (e.g. the Euclidean space) and the distance between a voter and a candidate is
part of the cost function of the voter [9–11, 18, 22]. For instance, for the social issue of building
a facility serving a neighborhood, it is natural to assume the cost of an individual is the distance
between the her and the facility. As another example, consider a government in the process of
making a public policy. If people are viewed to be on the left-right political spectrum, the cost of
an individual can be modeled as the distance between her and the policy on the spectrum. In both
cases, the voters and candidates are located in a metric space and the costs are the corresponding
distances.
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When the cardinal costs are assumed to be distances in an underlying metric space, it is possible
to achieve constant distortion. The work of [1] shows that selecting any candidate in the uncov-
ered set [19] — for instance, the Copeland voting rule — guarantees distortion of 5. (Please refer to
Section 2.4 for description of several common voting rules.) They also show a lower bound of 3 for
the distortion for any (deterministic) social choice rule. The exact value of the optimal distortion
remains an open question — neither the upper bound of 5 nor the lower bound of 3 has been im-
proved. The work of [24] shows that the well known voting schemes of using scoring rules, as well
as the popular single transferable vote, have super-constant distortion. The work of [16] shows the
ranked pairs rule and the Schulze method, both of which work on the weighted tournament graph
over candidates, have distortion of at least 5 contrary to previous belief that they could improve
the bound of 5. The weighted tournament graph places a directed edge between two candidates
with weight equal to the portion of voters who prefer the first candidate over the second. The work
of [16] then conjectured any social choice rule that only looks at the weighted tournament graph
over candidates cannot beat 5.
1.1 Our Results
Our first result in Section 3 disproves the conjecture that weighted tournament rules cannot im-
prove the distortion bound below 5. We improve the distortion upper bound to 2 +
√
5 ≈ 4.236
using a weighted tournament rule. We achieve the bound by generalizing the notion of uncovered
sets to a class of weighted rules. We show 4.236 is indeed the best distortion achievable by this
new class of social choice rules.
This still leaves a gap between the best lower bound of 3 and the upper bound of 4.236 for
deterministic social choice rules. In Section 4, we propose another social choice rule based on
bipartite matchings that generalizes uncovered sets in a different way. In Theorem 4.4, we show
that if a candidate exists that satisfies our criterion, then choosing this candidate yields distortion
of 3. In Section 4.3. we present a combinatorial conjecture that implies such a candidate always
exists, and verify this conjecture for small numbers of voters and candidates (at most 14 in all). As
another advantage of using this framework, we show a new result in Section 4.4 for certain types
of preference profiles: If the weighted tournament graph on the instance is cyclically symmetric,
then selecting any candidate yields distortion of at most 3 for that profile.
1.2 Related Work
Distortion of randomized social choice rules. In addition to deterministic social choices rules, ran-
domized rules have been studied in the metric distortion setting. It is possible that they can achieve
better distortion than deterministic ones: Randomly selecting a voter to be the dictator achieves dis-
tortion of 3 [2, 12]. On the other hand, no randomized rule can get distortion better than 2 [2, 12],
no truthful randomized rule can beat 3 [12] and no weighted tournament rule can beat 3 [16].
An almost distortion-optimal rule when the number of candidates is not large is shown in [17].
Randomized rules are unsatisfying for practical implementation and interpretability, and much
literature on social choice has therefore focused on deterministic voting rules.
Median distortion and fairness properties. In our paper, we define the social cost to be the sum
of the cost of each individual voter. There are other measures of how well a social choice rule
performs. The median distortion setting, where distortion is defined using the median cost instead
of the sum is considered in [1]. They show the Copeland rule achieves distortion of 5 in the setting
and is optimal. Fairness properties of social choice rules generalizes distortion in the sense that for
any k , it considers the sum of the k largest costs [16]. For this setting, the Copeland rule achieves a
fairness ratio of 5. Further, fairness ratio and distortion can only differ by at most 2 additively [15].
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We show in Section 3.2 that though our voting rule improves distortion for the sum of cost, it does
not improve distortion bounds for fairness properties.
Other Problems in the Metric Distortion Setting. The metric distortion framework is powerful
enough to be applied to settings beyond that considered in this work. When candidates are inde-
pendently drawn from the population of voters, the distortion can be better than 2 [7] and the
class of scoring rules that have constant expected distortion has a clean characterization [8]. Low-
distortion algorithms for the maximum bipartite matching problem in metric spaces are proposed
in [3]. Social choice and facility location problems in the distortion framework are studied in [4].
2 PRELIMINARIES
2.1 Social Choice Rules
Let C = {1, 2, . . . ,n} be a set of n candidates and V = {1′, 2′, . . . ,m′} be a set of m voters. Let
A = C ∪ V be the set of entities in the voting system. For each voter v ∈ V, she has a strict
preference ordering σv on the candidates in C. We call σ = {σv }v ∈V the voting profile. If v ∈ V
prefers c1 ∈ C to c2 ∈ C, we write c1 ≻v c2 or c2 ≺v c1. Let Ok be the family of strict orderings on
k elements. A social choice rule is a function
f :
∞⋃
n,m=1
(On)m → N
that takesm orderings on n candidates and outputs one of the n candidates. The output of f is the
winner of the social choice rule.
Throughout the paper, we reserve upper-case lettersA,B,C,D,X ,Y ,Z to denote candidates.AB
is the set of voters that prefer A to B. ABC is the set of voters that both prefer A to B and prefer B
toC . For any set S , we use |S | to denote the size of S . E.g., |AX | is the number of voters who prefer
A to X .
We will need the following definition later.
Definition 2.1. For any voterv ∈ V and any candidateX ∈ C, Pv (X ) := {X }∪{Y ∈ C | Y ≻v X }
is the set of candidates thatv likes at least as much as X . Similarly,Qv (X ) := {X } ∪ {Y ∈ C | Y ≺v
X } is the set of candidates that v likes at most as much as X .
2.2 Metric Distortion
We assume the candidates and the voters are located in the same metric space (A,d), where d :
A ×A → R≥0 is the metric (distance function). As a metric, d satisfies the following conditions:
(1) Positive definiteness: ∀i, j ∈ A,d(i, j) ≥ 0 and d(i, j) = 0 ⇐⇒ i = j .
(2) Symmetry: ∀i, j ∈ A,d(i, j) = d(j, i).
(3) Triangle inequality: ∀i, j,k ∈ A,d(i, j) + d(j,k) ≥ d(i,k).
We say a metric d is consistent with a voting profile σ if
∀v ∈ V,∀A,B ∈ C : A ≻v B =⇒ d(A,v) ≤ d(B,v).
Here we allow a voter to have equal distances to different candidates. This is only to eliminate the
need of infinitesimal distances in later analysis. Similar results can be derived if we require d(A,v)
and d(B,v) to be different in the above definition.
We define the social cost of a candidate X with respective to a metric d as:
S(X ,d) =
∑
v ∈V
d(v,X )
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Fig. 1. A Cyclically Symmetric Weighted Tournament Graph
and the distortion of a social choice rule f as:
∆(f ) = sup
σ
sup
d consistent with σ
S(f (σ ),d)
minA∈C S(A,d)
.
2.3 Weighted Tournament Graphs
We can construct a tournament graph on the candidates by looking at their pairwise relationships:
Let C be the set of vertices. For each pair of A,B ∈ C (A , B), draw an edge from A to B if A
pairwise beats B: |AB | = |{v ∈ V : A ≻v B}| ≥ m2 (break ties arbitrarily). The result is a directed
graph where there is exactly one directed edge between any pair of vertices. If a social choice
rule makes decision only based on the tournament graph, it is called a tournament rule, or a C1
rule [13].
One way to generalize the class of tournament rules is to further consider the margin of each
winning. For each pair of A,B ∈ C (A , B), draw an edge from A to B with weight |AB |m . In the
resulted weighted tournament graph, there are two directed edges between any pair of vertices.
A social choice rule making decision only based on the weighted tournament graph is called a
weighted tournament rule, or a C2 rule1 [13]. We also consider a subclass of weighted tournament
graphs that satisfy cyclic symmetry.
Definition 2.2. We say a graph is cyclically symmetric, if there exists a cyclic permutation τ on
the vertices, so that any edge (u,v) has the same weight as (τ (u), τ (v)).
Example 2.3. Let C = {A,B,C,D, E}. Figure 1 shows a cyclically symmetric weighted tourna-
ment graph. For each pair of vertices, only one edge is shown for visibility. The cyclic permutation
τ is
τ =
(
A B C D E
B C D E A
)
.
We note that cyclically symmetric weighted tournament graph is not necessarily induced by a
cyclically symmetric voting profile.
2.4 Examples of Social Choice Rules
Now we present some social choice rules from existing literature, along with their distortion
bounds.
1To be precise, in [13], a social choice rule is C2 only if it is not C1.
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Uncovered. The uncovered set of a tournament graph consists of those candidates A ∈ C such
that for any other candidate B, either there is an edge from A to B, or there is another candidate
C so that there are an edge from A to C and an edge from C to B [19]. The uncovered set is
always nonempty for any tournament graph.Uncovered is aC1 rule that selects the alphabetically
smallest candidate from the uncovered set. It has distortion of 5 [1].
Copeland. Copeland selects the candidate that has the most pairwise wins, i.e., the candidate
with the largest out-degree in the tournament graph (break ties alphabetically). Copeland is aC1
rule as well, and it can be seen as Uncovered with a specific tie-breaking method. It does not
improve the 5-distortion of Uncovered [1].
RankedPairs. RankedPairs is a C2 rule proposed in [25]. In RankedPairs, the edges of the
weighted tournament graph are sorted to have decreasing weights. We start from an empty graph
and add one edge at a time (in the order of decreasing weights) if it does not create a cycle. A
directed acyclic graph (DAG) is resulted in the end, and the source of the DAG is selected as the
winning candidate. It achieves distortion of 3 when the tournament graph has a circumference
(size of the largest cycle) of at most 4 [1]. However, its distortion is at least 5 in general [16].
Schulze. Schulze is a C2 rule proposed in [23]. For two candidates A and B in the weighted
tournament graph, define p(A,B) to be the maximum p so that there is a path from A to B with
each edge having weight of at least p. It can be shown that there is a candidate X ∈ C so that
p(X ,Y ) ≥ p(Y ,X ) for any other Y ∈ C. This X is selected as the winning candidate by Schulze.
Its distortion is at least 5 [16].
OptimalLP. In [16], the authors show that the optimal distortion can be achieved byOptimalLP
involving solving linear programs. The distortion of selecting candidate A comparing to selecting
B in an instance is given by the following linear program:
P(A,B,σ ) := maximize
∑
v ∈V
d(A,v)
subject to
∑
v ∈V
d(B,v) = 1,
d is consistent with σ .
OptimalLP selects the candidate argminA∈C maxB∈C P(A,B,σ ). Its distortion was known to be
between 3 and 5 (inclusive). Our work implies OptimalLP has distortion of at most 2 +
√
5.
3 WEIGHTED-UNCOVERED-SET VOTING RULE
In this section, we present the WeightedUncovered rule that has distortion of 2 +
√
5 ≈ 4.236
(Theorem 3.4), improving the best existing upper bound of 5 for any deterministic social choice
rule.WeightedUncovered is based on the λ-weighted uncovered set (Definition 3.1), a generaliza-
tion of the uncovered set [19]. We show our analysis is tight by giving a matching lower bound
(Theorem 3.10). We also give a lower bound for the fairness ratio (Theorem 3.12).
We start by introducing λ-weighted uncovered sets.
Definition 3.1. Let λ ∈ [0.5, 1] be a constant. The λ-weighted uncovered set is the set of candidates
A ∈ C such that for any candidate B , A, we have:
• either |AB | ≥ (1 − λ)m,
• or there is another nodeC < {A,B} so that |AC | ≥ (1 − λ)m and |CB | ≥ λm.
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Fig. 2. The Cycle in Lemma 3.2
Now we present our key lemma showing the λ-weighted uncovered set is a meaningful concept.
Lemma 3.2. For any λ ∈ [0.5, 1], the λ-weighted uncovered set is nonempty.
Proof. We prove by contradiction. Suppose there is no such nodeA. Then there must be nodes
X1,X2, . . . ,Xk ,Xk+1 = X1 in the graph. If we set A = Xi and B = Xi+1 (i = 1, 2, . . . ,k), then both
of the conditions in the lemma are violated. Figure 2 shows such a cycle.
Let aj =
|X1X j |
m
. We have ak =
|X1Xk |
m
> λ and a2 =
|X1X2 |
m
< 1−λ. When j goes from k down to 2,
aj has to drop below λ at some time, so we have aj > λ while aj−1 ≤ λ. Thus we have |X1X j | > λm
and |X j−1X1 | ≥ (1 − λ)m. This contradicts with the assumption that when A = X j−1 and B = X j ,
there is no such C = X1 satisfying the second condition in the lemma. 
Throughout this section, we use φ to denote the golden ratio
√
5−1
2
≈ 0.618.
Definition 3.3. WeightedUncovered is a social choice rule that picks the alphabetically small-
est candidate in the φ-weighted uncovered set.
Because of Lemma 3.2, WeightedUncovered is well-defined and always picks a candidate in
the φ-weighted uncovered set. We state the main property of WeightedUncovered below in
Theorem 3.4 and prove it later.
Theorem 3.4. WeightedUncovered has distortion of at most
(
2 +
√
5
)
≈ 4.236.
3.1 Main Theorem: Improved Distortion Bound
Recall that S(X ,d) = ∑v ∈V d(v,X ) is the social cost if X is selected and the metric is d . First, if
|AB | ≥ (1 − φ)m, the social cost gap between choosing A and B can be easily bounded.
Lemma 3.5. If |AB | ≥ (1 − φ)m, then S(A,d) ≤
(
2 +
√
5
)
S(B,d) for any metric d .
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Proof. We have(
2 +
√
5
)
S(B,d) − S(A,d) =
∑
v ∈AB
((
2 +
√
5
)
d(B,v) − d(A,v)
)
+
∑
v ∈BA
((
2 +
√
5
)
d(B,v) − d(A,v)
)
≥
∑
v ∈AB
(
1 +
√
5
)
d(B,v) −
∑
v ∈BA
d(A,B)
≥
∑
v ∈AB
1 +
√
5
2
d(A,B) −
∑
v ∈BA
d(A,B)
= d(A,B) ·
(
3 +
√
5
2
|AB | −m
)
≥ 0. 
When showing Copeland has distortion of at most 5, [1] crucially uses the following lemma:
Lemma 3.6 (Theorem 15 in [1]). If |AC | ≥ 12 ·m and |CB | ≥ 12 ·m, then S(A,d) ≤ 5S(B,d) for
any metric d .
Lemma 3.6 itself is tight, but worst-case analysis is deployed when we assume every edge in the
unweighted tournament graph has weight of 0.5. Actually, if every edge has weight approaching
0.5, any social choice rule will have distortion approaching 3 by a similar argument as Lemma 3.5.
Instead of having the stronger condition in the uncovered set that |AB | ≥ 0.5m, we allow those
candidateA’s with |AB | ≥ (1−λ)m tobe in the λ-weighted uncovered set. In this way,we can use un-
balanced |AC | and |CB | and still guarantee the λ-weighted uncovered set is nonempty (Lemma 3.2).
It turns out that better distortion can be achieved with carefully chosen parameters.
Lemma 3.7. If |AC | ≥ (1−φ)m and |CB | ≥ φm, then S(A,d) ≤
(
2 +
√
5
)
S(B,d) for any metric d .
To prove Lemma 3.7. We need the following technical lemma from [1], whose proof is included
here for completeness. Recall that Qv (A) is the set of candidates that v likes at most as much as A.
Lemma 3.8 (Lemma 14 in [1]). If
∑
v ∈V d(v,B) ≥ 1γ
∑
v ∈BA minC ∈Qv (A) d(B,C), then S(A,d) ≤
(1 + γ )S(B,d) for any metric d .
Proof. By definition of Qv (A) and the triangle inequality,
S(A,d)
S(B,d) =
∑
v ∈V d(A,v)∑
v ∈V d(B,v)
=
∑
v ∈AB d(A,v) +
∑
v ∈BA d(A,v)∑
v ∈V d(B,v)
≤
∑
v ∈AB d(B,v) +
∑
v ∈BA(d(A,v) − d(B,v) + d(B,v))∑
v ∈V d(B,v)
≤
∑
v ∈V d(B,v) +
∑
v ∈BAminC ∈Qv (A)(d(C,v) − d(B,v))∑
v ∈V d(B,v)
≤ 1 +
∑
v ∈BA minC ∈Qv (A) d(B,C)∑
v ∈V d(B,v)
≤ 1 + γ . 
Proof of Lemma 3.7. We perform different analysis depending on whetherd(C,B) ≥ d(A,B) or
d(C,B) < d(A,B).
Case (1):When d(C,B) ≥ d(A,B):∑
v ∈V
d(v,B) ≥
∑
v ∈CB
d(v,B) ≥ 1
2
∑
v ∈CB
d(C,B) = 1
2
|CB | · d(C,B).
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Using the assumption that d(C,B) ≥ d(A,B) in this case,∑
v ∈V
d(v,B) ≥ φm
2
· d(A,B) ≥ φ
2
·
∑
v ∈BA
d(A,B).
Then we apply Lemma 3.8 to get S(A,d) ≤
(
1 + 2
φ
)
S(B,d) =
(
2 +
√
5
)
S(B,d).
Case (2):When d(C,B) < d(A,B):∑
v ∈V
d(v,B) ≥
∑
v ∈AB∪BAC∪CBA
d(v,B)
≥ 1
2
∑
v ∈AB
d(A,B) +
∑
v ∈BAC
d(v,B) + 1
2
∑
v ∈CBA
d(B,C).
Notice that for v ∈ BAC , d(v,B) + d(B,C) ≥ d(v,C) ≥ d(v,A) ≥ d(A,B) − d(v,B). Thus,∑
v ∈V
d(v,B) ≥ 1
2
∑
v ∈AB
d(A,B) + 1
2
∑
v ∈BAC
(d(A,B) − d(B,C)) + 1
2
∑
v ∈CBA
d(B,C)
=
1
2
((|AB | + |BAC |) · d(A,B) + (|CBA| − |BAC |) · d(B,C))
=
1
2
((|AB | + |BAC |) · (d(A,B) − d(B,C)) + (|CBA| + |AB |) · d(B,C)) .
Because AC ⊆ BAC ∪ AB and CB ⊆ CBA ∪ AB,∑
v ∈V
d(v,B) ≥ 1
2
(|AC | · (d(A,B) − d(B,C)) + |CB | · d(B,C))
≥ 1
2
((1 − φ)m · (d(A,B) − d(B,C)) + φm · d(B,C)) .
The second inequality above comes from the conditions that |AC | ≥ (1 − φ)m, |CB | ≥ φm and the
assumption that d(A,B) > d(B,C) in this case. Therefore,∑
v ∈V
d(v,B) ≥ 1
2
(
1 − φ
φ
· |CA| · (d(A,B) − d(B,C)) + φ · |BA| · d(B,C)
)
≥ φ
2
((|CBA| + |BCA|) · (d(A,B) − d(B,C)) + (|CBA| + |BCA| + |BAC |) · d(B,C))
=
φ
2
((|CBA| + |BCA|) · d(A,B) + |BAC | · d(B,C))
=
φ
2
( ∑
v ∈CBA∪BCA
d(A,B) +
∑
v ∈BAC
d(B,C)
)
,
where the second inequality is fromCBA∪BCA ⊆ CA andCBA∪BCA∪BAC = BA. Again by BA =
CBA ∪ BCA ∪ BAC , we apply Lemma 3.8 to get S(A,d) ≤
(
1 + 2φ
)
S(B,d) =
(
2 +
√
5
)
S(B,d). 
Proof of Theorem 3.4. By Lemma 3.2,WeightedUncovered always selects a candidate in the
uncovered set. By Lemma 3.5, Lemma 3.7 and the definition of WeightedUncovered,Weighte-
dUncovered has distortion of at most 2 +
√
5. 
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3.2 Lower Bounds
An immediate question is whether our upper bound is tight. Also, is it possible to choose a λ , φ in
the λ-weighted uncovered set to improve the distortion? In this section, we show that our choice
of λ = φ and our analysis are indeed tight. Before showing the lower bounds, we complete the
definition of λ-weighted uncovered sets for λ < 0.5.
Definition 3.9. Let λ ∈ [0, 0.5) be a constant. The λ-weighted uncovered set is the set of candidates
A ∈ C such that for any candidate B , A, we have:
• either |AB | ≥ λm (different from the case where λ ≥ 0.5),
• or there is another nodeC < {A,B} so that |AC | ≥ (1 − λ)m and |CB | ≥ λm.
We did not define λ-weighted uncovered sets for λ < 0.5 earlier because for any such λ, selecting
any candidate in the λ-weighted uncovered set can have distortion worse than 5. Now we show
lower bounds for all λ ∈ [0, 1].
Theorem 3.10. For any λ ∈ [0, 1], choosing the alphabetically smallest candidate in the λ-weighted
uncovered set has distortion of at least 2 +
√
5.
Proof. The tight examples are illustrated in Figure 3. In both cases, all points lie on a straight
line. In the left case, let p portion of voters be of type v1 and 1 − p portion of voters be of type
v2.
2 When p ≤ 1 − φ, the distortion of choosing A is at least (1−φ)·1+φ ·2(1−φ)·1+φ ·0 = 2 +
√
5. Since A is in the
p-weighted uncovered set and (1 − p)-weighted uncovered set, we rule out λ ≤ 1 − φ and λ ≥ φ.
When λ ∈ (1−φ,φ), consider the right case in Figure 3. Let 1− λ portion of voters be of type v1
and λ portion of voters be of typev2.A is in the λ-weighted uncovered set. However, the distortion
for choosing A comparing to B is at least
(1−λ)·2+λ ·3
(1−λ)·0+λ ·1 = 3 + 2 · 1−λλ . When λ < φ, the distortion is
greater than 2 +
√
5. 
A B A B C
1 1 2 1 1
v1 : A ≻v1 B v2 : B ≻v2 A v1 : B ≻v1 A ≻v1 C
v2 : C ≻v2 B ≻v2 A
Fig. 3. Tight Examples for WeightedUncovered with Other Parameters
The fairness ratio of social choice rules was proposed in [16]:
Definition 3.11. The fairness ratio Φ(f ) of a social choice rule f is:
Φ(f ) = sup
σ
sup
d consistent with σ
max
1≤k≤m
maxR⊆V: |R |=k d(v, f (σ ))
minA∈C maxR⊆V: |R |=k d(v,A)
.
The fairness ratioΦ(f ) is at least the distortion ∆(f ) because it approximates the sum ofk largest
costs for any k includingm. The distortion of Copeland is 5 [1] and its fairness ratio is 5 [16] as
well. Since WeightedUncovered improves the distortion, one may ask whether it improves the
fairness ratio as well. We answer this in the negative:
2Technically this is only doable for λ ∈ Q, but we can add an arbitrarily small portion of other voters to make A in the
λ-weighted uncovered set.
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Theorem 3.12. For any λ ∈ [0, 1], choosing the alphabetically smallest candidate in the λ-weighted
uncovered set has a fairness ratio of at least 5.
Proof. When λ = 0 or λ = 1, the uncovered set contains every candidate so the fairness ratio
is +∞. Otherwise, consider a setting where C = {A,B,C} and V contains multiple copies of v1
and v2. The distances between pairs of points are given in Table 1. One can verify they satisfy the
triangle inequality.
The preference of v1 is C ≻ B ≻ A and that of v2 is C ≻ A ≻ B. Let λm voters be of v1 type
and (1 − λ)m voters be of v2 type.3 A is in the λ-weighted uncovered set, but the fairness ratio for
choosing A is at least 5 comparing to B, given by the worst-off 1 voter (v1). 
Points A B C v1 v2
A 0 4 4 5 3
B 4 0 2 1 1
C 4 2 0 1 3
v1 5 1 1 0 2
v2 3 1 3 2 0
Table 1. Adjacency Matrix of the Tight Example for Fairness
4 MATCHING-UNCOVERED-SET VOTING RULE
In this section, we present theMatchingUncovered rule, which is based on an alternative gener-
alization of uncovered sets. We introduce matching uncovered sets and the MatchingUncovered
rule in Section 4.1, after which we analyze its distortion (Theorem 4.4) in Section 4.2. In Section 4.3,
we propose a conjecture (Conjecture 4.8) which implies the distortion of MatchingUncovered is
3. We use computer-assisted search to verify it holds when at most 14 entities are involved (The-
orem 4.11). Finally, we give a sufficient condition (Lemma 4.13) for the matching uncovered set to
be nonempty in Section 4.4. We use this new condition to show when the weighted tournament
graph is cyclically symmetric, every social choice rule has distortion of at most 3 (Theorem 4.12).
4.1 Description
Recall that as in Definition 2.1, Pv (A) is the set of candidates that v likes as least as much as A and
Qv (A) is the set of candidates that v likes as most as much as A.
Definition 4.1. The matching uncovered set is the set of candidates A ∈ C such that: For any
other candidate B , A, there is a perfect matching in the bipartite graph G(A,B) constructed in
the following way:
• The vertices on the left and vertices on the right are bothV.
• For a vertex v on the left and a vertex v ′ on the right, we draw an edge between them if
Pv (B) ∩Qv ′(A) , .
Example 4.2. Let C = {A,B,C} andV = {1, 2, 3}. The preference profile is:
A ≻1 B ≻1 C
B ≻2 C ≻2 A
C ≻3 A ≻3 B
3Again, this is only doable for λ ∈ Q, but we can add an arbitrarily small portion of other voters to make the λ-weighted
uncovered set include A. Instead of looking at the worst-off 1 voter in the end, we look at the worst-off ε portion of voters
for a small ε .
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A is in the matching uncovered set becauseG(A,B),G(A,C) both have perfect matchings, as shown
in Figure 4 and Figure 5. By cyclic symmetry, B and C are in the matching uncovered set too.
P1(B) = {A,B}
P2(B) = {B}
P3(B) = {A,B,C}
Q1(A) = {A,B,C}
Q2(A) = {A}
Q3(A) = {A,B}
1
2
3
1
2
3
Fig. 4. The Bipartite GraphG(A,B)
P1(C) = {A,B,C}
P2(C) = {B,C}
P3(C) = {C}
Q1(A) = {A,B,C}
Q2(A) = {A}
Q3(A) = {A,B}
1
2
3
1
2
3
Fig. 5. The Bipartite GraphG(A,C)
Definition 4.3. MatchingUncovered is a social choice rule that picks the alphabetically small-
est candidate in the matching uncovered set. It picks the alphabetically smallest candidate if the
matching uncovered set is empty.
4.2 Distortion Analysis
The next theorem is the main reason why we introduce matching uncovered sets.
Theorem 4.4. Selecting any candidate from the matching uncovered set guarantees distortion of
at most 3.
Corollary 4.5. If the matching uncovered set is nonempty, MatchingUncovered has distortion
of at most 3.
Before proving Theorem 4.4, we introduce a new notation specifically for proving distortion of
3. Fixing the preference orderings {σk }mk=1, define
U (v,A,B,d) := d(A,v) − 3d(B,v).
Lemma 4.6. A social choice rule f has distortion of at most 3 if and only if for any voting profile
σ = {σk }mk=1 and for any other candidate B , f (σ ),∑
v ∈V
U (v, f (σ ) ,B,d) ≤ 0
for any metric d that is consistent with σ .
Proof. Let A = f (σ ). A social choice rule f has distortion of at most 3 if and only if for any
profile σ and any metric d consistent with σ ,
∑
v ∈V d(A,v) ≤ 3
∑
v ∈V d(B,v) for any other B ∈ C,
i.e.,
∑
v ∈V U (v,A,B,d) ≤ 0. 
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Lemma 4.7. For a voter v and any consistent metric d :
(1) If v has preference Y ≻v B ≻v A ≻v X , then U (v,A,B,d) ≤ d(B,X ) − d(B,Y ).
(2) If v has preference Y ≻v B ≻v A, then U (v,A,B,d) ≤ d(A,B) − d(B,Y ).
(3) If v has preference B ≻v A ≻v X , then U (v,A,B,d) ≤ d(B,X ).
(4) If v has preference A ≻v B, then U (v,A,B,d) ≤ −d(A,B).
(5) For any v ,U (v,A,B,d) ≤ d(A,B).
Proof. By the preference of v and triangle inequality:
(1) If v has preference Y ≻v B ≻v A ≻v X , then
U (v,A,B,d) = (d(v,A) − d(v,B)) − (d(v,B) + d(v,B))
≤ (d(v,X ) − d(v,B)) − (d(v,B) + d(v,Y ))
≤ d(B,X ) − d(B,Y ).
(2) If v has preference Y ≻v B ≻v A, then
U (v,A,B,d) = (d(v,A) − d(v,B)) − (d(v,B) + d(v,B))
≤ (d(v,A) − d(v,B)) − (d(v,B) + d(v,Y ))
≤ d(A,B) − d(B,Y ).
(3) If v has preference B ≻v A ≻v X , then
U (v,A,B,d) = (d(v,A) − d(v,B)) − 2d(v,B)
≤ d(v,X ) − d(v,B)
≤ d(B,X ).
(4) If v has preference A ≻v B, then
U (v,A,B,d) = 2(d(v,A) − d(v,B)) − (d(v,A) + d(v,B))
≤ −(d(v,A)+ d(v,B))
≤ −d(A,B).
(5) For any v ,
U (v,A,B,d) = d(v,A) − d(v,B) − 2d(v,B)
≤ d(v,A) − d(v,B)
≤ d(A,B). 
Proof of Theorem 4.4. Because of Lemma 4.6, we only need to show
∑
v ∈V U (v,A,B,d) ≤ 0
if there is a perfect matching in G(A,B).
We divide the set of voters into two disjoint subsets: AB (those who prefer A to B) and BA. By
(4) in Lemma 4.7, we have∑
v ∈V
U (v,A,B,d) =
∑
v ∈AB
U (v,A,B,d) +
∑
v ∈BA
U (v,A,B,d)
≤ −|AB | · d(A,B) +
∑
v ∈BA
U (v,A,B,d).
For a voter v , we use Lv to denote the vertex on the left representing Pv (B) and Rv the vertex on
the right representingQv (A). Because there is a perfect matching in the graphG(A,B), there has to
be a matching of size at leastm− 2|AB | within the vertices representing BA: {Lv | v ∈ BA} ∪ {Rv |
v ∈ BA}. We write M(u) to denote the boolean variable whether the vertex u is matched in this
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smaller matching. If M(u) is true, we write K(u) to denote the common candidate that u uses in
the matching. Note that the common candidate cannot be A or B between vertices representing
BA. We have∑
v ∈BA
U (v,A,B,d)
=
∑
v ∈BA:M(Lv )∧M(Rv )
U (v,A,B,d) +
∑
v ∈BA:M(Lv )∧¬M(Rv )
U (v,A,B,d)
+
∑
v ∈BA:¬M(Lv )∧M(Rv )
U (v,A,B,d) +
∑
v ∈BA:¬M(Lv )∧¬M(Rv )
U (v,A,B,d)
≤
∑
v ∈BA:M(Lv )∧M(Rv )
(d(B,K(Rv)) − d(B,K(Lv ))) +
∑
v ∈BA:M(Lv )∧¬M(Rv )
(d(A,B) − d(B,K(Lv)))
+
∑
v ∈BA:¬M(Lv )∧M(Rv )
d(B,K(Rv )) +
∑
v ∈BA:¬M(Lv )∧¬M(Rv )
d(A,B)
=
∑
v ∈BA:M(Lv )∧¬M(Rv )
d(A,B) +
∑
v ∈BA:¬M(Lv )∧¬M(Rv )
d(A,B)
=
∑
v ∈BA:¬M(Rv )
d(A,B).
The inequality above is by Lemma 4.7. The second last step is because the terms of d(B,K(Rv ))
and −d(B,K(Lv)) cancel out in a matching. Therefore,∑
v ∈V
U (v,A,B,d) ≤ −|AB | · d(A,B) +
∑
v ∈BA
U (v,A,B,d)
≤ −|AB | · d(A,B) + |{v ∈ BA | ¬M(Rv )}| · d(A,B)
≤ 0.
The last step is because |{v ∈ BA | ¬M(Rv )}| is the number of unmatched vertices on the right in
the smaller matching within BA, which is at most |BA| − (m − 2|AB |) = |AB |. 
4.3 Existence Conjecture
Now we present a combinatorial conjecture which, if true, will guarantee MatchingUncovered
has distortion of 3.
Conjecture 4.8. For any C = {X1,X2, . . . ,Xn} and V , for any voting profile, at least one of
the bipartite graphs G(X1,X2),G(X2,X3),G(X3,X4), . . . ,G(Xn−1,Xn) and G(Xn,X1) has a perfect
matching.
Conjecture 4.8 immediately implies thatMatchingUncovered has distortion of 3: If the match-
ing uncovered set is empty, we can start at any vertex A, find the graphG(A,B) without a perfect
matching, then go to B and repeat until we find a cycle X1,X2, . . . ,Xt . We delete any candidate
not on the cycle from the voting profile and maintain relative orders for other candidates. Since
G(Xk ,Xk+1) does not have a perfect matching before the deletions, G(Xk ,Xk+1) constructed after
the deletions does not have a perfectmatching either. However, Conjecture 4.8 denies the existence
of such a cycle. (C in Conjecture 4.8 is the set of candidates on the cycle.)
Though we are not able to prove or disprove Conjecture 4.8, we can show it when the number
of candidates or the number of voters is at most 3.
Theorem 4.9. When |C| ≤ 3, Conjecture 4.8 holds.
Kamesh Munagala and Kangning Wang 14
Proof. When |C| = 2, a candidate A is preferred to the other candidate B by at least half of the
voters. There is a perfect matching inG(A,B). When |C| = 3, assume a counterexample exists. Let
C = {A = X1,B = X2,C = X3}. Let a = |ABC |m ,b =
|BCA |
m
, c =
|CAB |
m
, x =
|ACB |
m
,y =
|BAC |
m
, z =
|CBA |
m . In order that none ofG(A,B),G(B,C),G(C,A) has a perfect matching, we need
2(a + c + x) +min(y, z) < 1
2(b + a + y) +min(z, x) < 1
2(c + b + z) +min(x ,y) < 1
.
Notice that if we move the weight for a (b, c respectively) to z (x , y respectively), all three expres-
sions on the left become weakly smaller. Thus we can assume a = b = c = 0 without loss of
generality. Therefore we need 
2x +min(y, z) < 1
2y +min(z, x) < 1
2z +min(x ,y) < 1
while x + y + z = 1. Without loss of generality, assume x = max(x ,y, z). Then 2x + min(y, z) =
2max(x ,y, z) +min(x ,y, z) ≥ x +y + z = 1. Thus the set of inequalities cannot be simultaneously
satisfied. 
Theorem 4.10. When |V| ≤ 3, Conjecture 4.8 holds.
Proof. When |V| ≤ 2, the first voter must prefer some Xk to Xk+1 (or Xn to X1). There is a
perfect matching inG(Xk ,Xk+1) then. When |V| = 3, we prove by contradiction and assume such
a counterexample exists. LetV = {v1,v2,v3}. For each i = 1, 2, . . . ,n, at least 2 voters prefer Xi+1
to Xi . If all voters prefer Xi+1 to Xi , we can remove Xi in the cycle and there will not be a perfect
matching inG(Xi−1,Xi+1). Therefore without loss of generality, for each i = 1, 2, . . . ,n, we assume
exactly 2 voters prefer Xi+1 to Xi . Again without loss of generality, let X1 be the top choice of v3.
Then v1 and v2 must prefer X2 to X1. Let k be the smallest one such that v3 prefers Xk+1 to Xk .
Among candidates X1,X2, . . . ,Xk , the preference of v1 and v2 is Xk ≻ Xk−1 ≻ · · · ≻ X1 while
the preference of v3 is X1 ≻ X2 ≻ · · · ≻ Xk . This k must be strictly less than n for G(Xn,X1)
not to have a perfect matching. NoticeG(Xk ,Xk+1) must have a perfect matching: there is a voter
preferring Xk to Xk+1 contributing 2 matches. The other two voters contribute one match because
of the common X1 (v1 or v2 has Xk ≻ X1 and v3 has X1 ≻ Xk+1). 
Besides the cases where min(|C|, |V|) ≤ 3, we performed computer-assisted search to enu-
merate all possible voting profiles for small (|C|, |V|) pairs, and we were not able to find any
counterexample. Combining with Lemma 4.9 and Lemma 4.10, we show the following result:
Theorem 4.11. When (|C|, |V|) ∈ E, Conjecture 4.8 holds. Here
E =([3] × N) ∪ ([4] × [20]) ∪ ([5] × [11]) ∪ ([6] × [8]) ∪ ([7] × [7])
∪ ([8] × [6]) ∪ ([9] × [5]) ∪ ([10] × [4]) ∪ (N × [3]).
In particular, when |C| + |V| ≤ 14, Conjecture 4.8 holds. In other words, if the circumfer-
ence (size of the largest cycle) of the tournament graph plus the number of voters is at most 14,
MatchingUncovered achieves distortion of 3.
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4.4 Cyclically Symmetric Weighted Tournament Graphs
In this section, we prove that for any instance inducing a cyclically symmetric weighted tourna-
ment graph, the distortion of selecting any candidate is at most 3. Recall that by cyclic symmetry,
we mean there exists a cyclic permutation τ on the vertices, so that any edge (u,v) has the same
weight as (τ (u), τ (v)).
Theorem4.12. For any preference profile that induces a cyclically symmetric weighted tournament
graph, every social choice rule achieves distortion of at most 3.
Our proof crucially relies on the notion of matching uncovered sets. We first introduce a simpler
test for the existence of perfect matchings in G(A,B).
Lemma 4.13. Let w(X ,Y ) = |XY |
m
be the weight of edge XY in the weighted tournament graph. If
there is no perfect matching inG(A,B), then in the tournament graph,
(w(A,B),w(B,A)) − ©­«
⋃
C ∈(C−{A,B })
[w(C,A),w(C,B)]ª®¬
must be nonempty. Here [a,b] denotes the closed interval {x ∈ R | a ≤ x ≤ b} and (a,b) denotes the
open interval.
Proof. If there is no perfect matching in G(A,B), there must be an independent set of at least
m + 1 vertices. Therefore, for sufficiently small ε > 0, there exists x ∈ (0, 1), so that at least x + ε
portion of vertices on the right are disjoint with at least 1−x + ε portion of vertices on the left. As
a result, we can select Qv (A)’s for at least x + ε portion of v ∈ V and Pv ′(B)’s for at least 1− x + ε
portion of v ′ ∈ V , and make each Qv (A) disjoint with each Pv ′(B).
This x must be in the interval (w(A,B),w(B,A)), otherwise the selected Qv (A)’s and Pv ′(B)’s
will share a common A or B. For any other candidate C , either C does not appear in the selected
Qv (A)’s, or it does not appear in the selected Pv ′(B)’s. It implies either w(A,C) ≤ 1 − x − ε , or
w(C,B) ≤ x − ε . (Otherwise, there are too many Qv (A)’s or Pv ′(B)’s containing C , which makes
the selection impossible.) Thus, x <W (C,A) or x >W (C,B). 
Lemma 4.14. For any preference profile that induces a cyclically symmetric weighted tournament
graph, every candidate is in the matching uncovered set.
Proof. We only need to show every G(A,B) has a perfect matching. We will use Lemma 4.13
and show
(w(A,B),w(B,A)) − ©­«
⋃
C ∈(C−{A,B })
[w(C,A),w(C,B)]ª®¬
is empty. Let τ be the cyclic permutation that shows the cyclically symmetric structure of the
weighted tournament graph. Let B = τ k (A) and д be the greatest common divisor of k and n. Let
h = n/д be the minimum positive integer that τ kh is the identity permutation. If h = 2, then
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w(A,B) = w(B,A) so (w(A,B),w(B,A)) = . Otherwise,
©­«
⋃
C ∈(C−{A,B })
[w(C,A),w(C,B)]ª®¬ ⊇
h−1⋃
j=2
[
w
(
τ jk (A),A
)
,w
(
τ jk (A), τ k (A)
)]
=
h−1⋃
j=2
[
w
(
τ jk (A),A
)
,w
(
τ (j−1)k (A),A
)]
⊇
[
w
(
τ (h−1)k (A),A
)
,w
(
τ (2−1)k (A),A
)]
=
[
w
(
τhk (A), τ k (A)
)
,w
(
τ k (A),A
)]
= [w (A,B) ,w (B,A)] .
Thus (w(A,B),w(B,A)) − (⋃C ∈(C−{A,B })[w(C,A),w(C,B)]) =  so G(A,B) has a perfect matching
by Lemma 4.13. 
Proof of Theorem 4.12. By Lemma 4.14 and Theorem 4.4, if the weighted tournament graph
is symmetric, every candidate is in the matching uncovered set, so selecting any candidate gives
distortion of 3. 
In [1], the authors show the class of (unweighted) tournament rules has a distortion lower bound
of 5. They construct an instance with a cyclically symmetric (unweighted) tournament graph
where selecting one of the candidates has distortion of 5. The class of tournament rules cannot
always avoid selecting the bad candidate so a lower bound of 5 is established. Theorem 4.12 shows
that the exact same technique with cyclically symmetric tournament graphs cannot be applied to
establish a non-trivial lower bound for the class of weighted tournament rules. It remains an open
question that whether weighted tournament rules are strictly weaker thanOptimalLP in terms of
distortion.
We note that, in Conjecture 4.8, we cannot replace the condition thatG(Xk ,Xk+1) has no perfect
matching by that in Lemma 4.13. Otherwise the conjecture is false by the following example.
Example 4.15. Consider the weighted tournament graph shown in Figure 6.
A
B C
D
0.3
0.35
0.35
0.3
0.45 0.5
Fig. 6. A Counterexample for an Oversimplification with Lemma 4.13
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Only one edge between each pair of vertices is drawn for visibility, and the weight of the other
one is simply 1 minus that of the drawn one. The graph is realizable by the following voting profile:
i = 1, 2, . . . , 35 : B ≻i A ≻i D ≻i C
i = 36, 37, . . . , 45 : C ≻i B ≻i A ≻i D
i = 46, 47, . . . , 60 : D ≻i C ≻i B ≻i A
i = 61, 62, . . . , 70 : C ≻i D ≻i B ≻i A
i = 71, 72, . . . , 85 : A ≻i D ≻i C ≻i B
i = 86, 87, . . . , 95 : C ≻i A ≻i D ≻i B
i = 96, 97, . . . , 100 : C ≻i D ≻i A ≻i B
There are perfect matchings in G(C,D) and G(D,A), but
(w(A,B),w(B,A)) − [w(C,A),w(C,B)] − [w(D,A),w(D,B)]
= (0.3, 0.7) − [0.5, 0.65] − [0.3, 0.55] , ,
(w(B,C),w(C,B)) − [w(D,B),w(D,C)] − [w(A,B),w(A,C)]
= (0.35, 0.65) − [0.55, 0.65] − [0.3, 0.5] , ,
(w(C,D),w(D,C)) − [w(A,C),w(A,D)] − [w(B,C),w(B,D)]
= (0.35, 0.65) − [0.5, 0.7] − [0.35, 0.45] , ,
(w(D,A),w(A,D)) − [w(B,D),w(B,A)] − [w(C,D),w(C,A)]
= (0.3, 0.7) − [0.45, 0.7] − [0.35, 0.5] , .
5 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
In this paper, we propose a deterministic social choice ruleWeightedUncoveredwhich improves
the best distortion upper bound from 5 to 2 +
√
5. We also show that this class of rules cannot im-
prove the distortion beyond 2+
√
5 or improve the fairness ratio of Copeland.MatchingUncov-
ered, on the other hand, may achieve better distortion as well as fairness ratio. The open question
remains:
What is the optimal distortion for the deterministic social choice problem?
We know OptimalLP is a polynomial-time mechanism achieving optimal distortion, but rules of
simpler forms may be more desirable in practice:
Does OptimalLP have strictly better distortion than WeightedUncovered,
MatchingUncovered, and the class of weighted tournament rules?
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